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Abstract—Business processes, as the instruments used by
organisations to produce value, need to comply with a number
of internally and externally imposed standards and restrictions.
Since the majority of such processes involve the exchange of
sensitive third party information, their compliance to security
constraints needs to be verified before they can be implemented.
Current attempts for the verification of security compliance of
design-time business process models involve the transformation of
both the model and the desired security properties into formal
specifications, which can be then used as input for automated
model checkers. Such an approach is usually costly both in terms
of time and specialised knowledge, while also its coverage can be
limited to specific types of security requirements. In this work we
introduce an approach for the verification of security in business
process models based on structural properties of the workflow
of the process. To that end, we introduce a series of attributes
to existing BPMN 2.0 concepts and algorithms for checking the
compliance of a process model against the most common security
requirements. Finally, a real-world business process is used to
demonstrate and evaluate the applicability of our proposal.
Keywords—Business Process Security, Security Verification,
Business Process Modelling, BPMN
I. INTRODUCTION
Since business processes are designed by humans using a
number of different available modelling languages, they can
include a certain degree of subjectivity and arbitrariness which
may lead to varying interpretations of the same model by
different stakeholders. It is, therefore, important that, before
a business process model becomes an executable business
process, its properties and functionalities are formally verified
[1]. One of the most important properties of business process
models, in need of verification, is security. Since most business
processes revolve around the exchange of information between
different participants, the security of such information assets
becomes a critical factor for the success of the overall busi-
ness process. Moreover, the compliance of an organisation’s
business processes to security standards can be an internally
(e.g., organisational policies) and externally (e.g., laws and
regulations) imposed requirement [2].
Business Process Compliance Management (BPCM) is the
field of study involved with the compliance checking of
business processes. Proactive, or forward compliance checking
techniques can prevent the actual execution of non-compliant
behaviour [3] as they are applied during the design of a busi-
ness process. Such approaches often use formal specification
languages and automated model checking to verify certain
properties of a business process model. Due to the importance
of security properties of business process models, a number
of approaches specialising in security compliance verification
have been developed. Nevertheless, as extensively discussed in
Section V, since the formal specification of both the process
models and their security requirements introduces considerable
overhead in specialised knowledge and time, the adoption of
such approaches in real life remains rather limited [2], [4].
In this work, we introduce an attribute-based security ver-
ification approach for business process models, which aims
to provide increased usability and broad coverage for the
traditional types of security requirements (authentication, au-
thorisation, confidentiality, integrity, availability). To achieve
that, a series of attributes are introduced to existing BPMN
2.0 concepts [5] in order to capture information relevant to the
analysis of the security properties of the process model. Using
such attributes, conditions that need to apply in a process
model for the satisfaction of each type of security requirement
are defined. Finally, for each type of security requirement, an
algorithm is introduced, for verifying the compliance to such
conditions. Our approach is applied to a real-life process from
the public administration domain, in order to demonstrate and
evaluate its functionality.
The rest of this work is structured as follows, Section II
introduces the attributes necessary for the security verification
process. Section III presents the process of instantiating the
introduced attributes and the algorithms that make use of them
to verify different types of security requirements. Section IV
presents the application of our approach in a real-life scenario.
Finally, related work and its limitations are discussed in
Section V, while final remarks and future work directions are
discussed in Section VI.
II. SECURITY RELATED ATTRIBUTES
The modelling of security related aspects is not natively
supported by contemporary graphical process modelling lan-
guages such as BPMN [6]. Nevertheless, the ability to reason
and verify the security properties of a business process model
requires concepts able to capture security related aspects of its
elements. To that end, we propose new attributes to be added to
concepts of BPMN collaboration diagrams, which will then be
used for security verification purposes. A partial metamodel
containing the BPMN concepts relevant to our work, along
with their newly introduced attributes is presented in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Partial BPMN metamodel with security-related attributes
The newly introduced attributes, an overview of which is
provided in Table I, capture information regarding properties
of the business process elements which are essential for the
verification of their security. The type of information they
capture can be categorised in two groups, workflow related
and security related information.
The workflow-related information is captured by the owner,
source and target attributes, attached to the concepts of
Activity and Data Object. These attributes aim to capture
information regarding the position of each instance of activities
and data objects within the workflow of a business process
model. More specifically, for the concept of Activity, the
owner attribute indicates the lane of which this activity is part
of, thus relating information regarding the entity in charge of
the activity’s execution. For instance in the example process
fragment of Fig. 2, the attribute instantiation A1.owner should
return the value L1, since the activity with id A1 belongs to the
lane L1. The source and target attributes capture the activity
executed immediately before and after the execution of the
activity at hand, as dictated by the workflow of the business
process. An example of the use of such attributes can be shown
based on the process fragment of Fig. 2, where for the activity
with id A2 the attribute declaration A2.source returns A1 and
A2.target returns A3. As indicated by the multiplicity of the
source and target attributes of the Activity concept in Fig. 1,
there can be no source or target for an activity, in case an
event triggers or is triggered by its execution (e.g., start or end
events). It can also be the case that multiple sources or targets
exist in case of workflow splits or joins due to gateways.
By checking the owner attribute of a source or target of an
activity, we can deduce whether the workflow of the process
is transferred from one lane to another, which is information
of high relevance for the analysis and verification of secu-
rity properties. Such deductions can be made using complex
queries, which combine more than one type of attribute. For
instance, in the example of Fig. 2, if the lane where the
workflow leads after the execution of activity A2 needs to
be identified, the attribute combination (A2.target).owner can
be utilised. The first part of this declaration (i.e., A2.target)
returns activity A3, and the next part of the declaration (i.e.,
A3.owner) returns L2 as the lane that contains the activity that
follows the execution of A2.
The same applies for the owner, source and target attributes
of the Data Object concept, with the only difference being that
the source and target represent the activities that create/modify
or consume the data object at hand. For instance, D1.source
in Fig. 2 should return A3 while D1.target should return A4.
Fig. 2. Example process fragment
The second group of attributes captures security needs
and properties of the Lane, Activity and Data Object ele-
ments. More specifically, the attributes introduced at the Lane
concept indicate whether or not the entity represented by
such a lane has been authenticated and what is its level
of authorisation. Such properties of a lane are vital for the
verification of security properties, as they indicate whether
the entity modelled by the lane can access certain activities
or data objects. The Data Object concept includes a number
of attributes in order to capture different types of security
needs (e.g., authentication required, authorisation required,
confidentiality required etc.). The attributes relating to the
need of authentication and authorisation are also included in
the Activity concept. Such attributes are used for identifying
which types of security needs must be checked during the
security verification. Other than attributes used to capture
needs, the Data Object concept also includes attributes for
capturing certain security-related properties, such as the ex-
istence of secure channels between the data object and a
lane. Such properties are an important component of the
security verification process, which will be presented in the
next section.
Finally, other than the introduction of attributes to existing
concepts, we have also introduced a new type of BPMN activ-
ity called Security Implementing Activity. Such a type of activ-
ity is concerned with the operationalisation of security at the
process level by the implementation of security mechanisms
and countermeasures. The type of security objective fulfilled
by each security implementing activity is captured by its se-
curity objective attribute, while a set of methods are available
for allowing such activities to interact with the attributes of
other process elements. The selection of appropriate security
mechanisms is considered to be outside the scope of this
work and so security implementing activities are considered
as “black boxes”. The security verification process proposed
in this work is, therefore, implementation agnostic and mainly
concerned with the effect that the structural properties of a
business process model have on the satisfaction of the security
requirements of the process.
III. ATTRIBUTE INSTANTIATION AND SECURITY
VERIFICATION
The attributes presented in the previous section are utilised
for the verification of security objectives. The process for the
instantiation of such attributes and the algorithm used for the
verification of each security objective will be presented in the
rest of this section.
1) Authentication: Authentication is defined as the provi-
sion of assurance that a claimed characteristic of an entity is
correct [7]. In the context of business processes, authentication
entails the verification of a credential of a subject using
security mechanisms [8]. The subjects of a business process
are its participating entities, which can be, among others,
individuals or groups of human participants, software systems
or organisations. (Swim)lanes are used in BPMN 2.0 as a
graphical representation of a participant in a business process
model [5]. Therefore, authentication is a security objective
associated with the lanes of a business process model.
To capture the authentication property of a process partic-
ipant, the attribute authenticated has been introduced at the
Lane concept, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Security implementing
activities which operationalise the authentication security ob-
jective, as indicated by the value of their security objective
attribute, can access the authenticated attribute of a lane l
and set it to TRUE using their set authentication(l) method.
The attribute authentication required has been introduced to
the Activity and Data Object concepts to capture whether they
require participants to be authenticated before accessing them.
Algorithm 1 defines the steps for the verification of the
authentication property of activities and data objects. The
procedure AUTHENTICATION CHECK A takes an ac-
tivity as input (line 1) and identifies each of its preceding
activities(line 2). If such activities belongs to a different lane
that the activity at hand and if that lane is authenticated
(line 3), then the authentication constraint of the activity is
considered satisfied. Similarly, the procedure AUTHENTI-
CATION CHECK DO takes a data object as input (line 9)
and, for each of the activities having the data object as input
(line 10), checks whether they belong to a different lane than
the data object and whether that lane is authenticated (line 11).
2) Authorisation: Authorisation requires the restriction of
access to assets based on certain business or security require-
ments of an entity [7]. In the context of a business process
model, authorisation involves a lane, representing the entity
that wants to access an asset, the authorisation level of that
entity, and the asset itself, which can be either an activity or
a data object [8].
A number of attributes have been introduced, as shown in
Fig. 1, for the instantiation and checking of the authorisation
objective. More specifically, the attribute authorisation level
is used for capturing the level of authorisation of each process
lane. The attribute authorisation required is used to capture
the minimum level of authorisation required by an entity for
accessing an activity or data object. Finally, security imple-
menting activities with the security objective attribute set to
authorisation, perform the set authorisation(l, v) method to
set the authorisation level of a lane l to a value v.
In the context of a business process model, authorisation
checking, performed using Algorithm 2, involves following the
workflow of the process to identify all the entities that interact
with the authorisation-constraint process elements. In case of
an authorisation-constraint activity, procedure AUTHORISA-
TION CHECK A identifies each activity that precedes it in
the workflow (line 2). If that activity belongs to a different
lane than the constraint activity (line 3) and the authorisa-
tion level of that lane is greater or equal to the minimum
authorisation level required by the constraint activity (line 4),
the authorisation constraint is satisfied. In the case of a data
object, a similar authorisation checking process is followed
using the procedure AUTHORISATION CHECK DO but,
in this case, each activity using the data object as input is
identified (line 12). If such activity belongs to a lane different
than the data object (line 13), then the authorisation level of
such lane is compared to the authorisation level required by
the constraint data object (line 14) and if it is greater or equal
the authorisation constraint is considered satisfied (line 15).
3) Confidentiality: Confidentiality refers to the protection
of information from disclosure to unauthorised entities [9].
Therefore, in terms of business process models, confidentiality
is a property of a data object, which is the concept BPMN 2.0
utilises to capture information assets. Defining confidentiality
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for authentication checking
1: procedure AUTHENTICATION CHECK A(Activity)
2: for all Activity.source do
3: if Activity.owner 6= (Activity.source).owner and ((Activity.source).owner).authenticated == TRUE then
4: return TRUE
5: end if
6: end for
7: end procedure
8:
9: procedure AUTHENTICATION CHECK DO(DataObject)
10: for all DataObject.target do
11: if DataObject.owner 6= (DataObject.target).owner and ((DataObject.target).owner).authenticated ==
TRUE then
12: return TRUE
13: end if
14: end for
15: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Algorithms for authorisation checking
1: procedure AUTHORISATION CHECK A(Activity)
2: for all Activity.source do
3: if Activity.owner 6= (Activity.source).owner then
4: if ((Activity.source).owner).authorisation level ≥ Activity.authorisation required then
5: return TRUE
6: end if
7: end if
8: end for
9: end procedure
10:
11: procedure AUTHORISATION CHECK DO(DataObject)
12: for all DataObject.target do
13: if DataObject.owner 6= (DataObject.target).owner then
14: if ((DataObject.target).owner).authorisation level ≥ DataObject.authorisation required then
15: return TRUE
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
19: end procedure
also requires the identification of authorised entities that can
access the information [10]. Thus, the concept of a swimlane
is, once again, required for the definition of confidentiality in
the context of business processes.
A number of attributes have been introduced for reasoning
about confidentiality in business process models, as shown
in Fig. 1. The attribute confidentiality required introduced in
the Data Object concept indicates whether the confidentiality
objective has to be met for accessing a data object. The
attribute secure channel[Lane], also introduced in the data
object concept, indicates whether a communication channel
capable of confidential data transmission exists between the
data object and a specific entity, modelled as a lane in the
business process. In order to establish confidentiality, appro-
priate security implementing activities need to be introduced
in the business process. To that end, security implementing
activities operationalising the confidentiality security objective
(i.e., security objective attribute is set to confidentiality) have
the method set confidentiality(). That method takes as input a
confidentiality-constraint data object and a lane and, if a secure
connection exists between them, assigns the value TRUE to
the secure channel[Lane] attribute of the data object.
Algorithm 3 verifies whether the confidentiality objective
of a data object is met by a business process model. The
algorithm takes a data object as input and checks all the
outgoing workflows sourcing from that data object (line 2).
For each outgoing workflow leading to a lane that is different
than the one currently owning the data object (line 3), the
authorisation level of that lane is compared to the minimum
authorisation level required by the data object (authorisa-
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for confidentiality checking
1: procedure CONFIDENTIALITY CHECK(DataObject)
2: for all (DataObject.target).owner do
3: if DataObject.owner 6= (DataObject.target).owner then
4: if ((DataObject.target).owner).authorisation level ≥ DataObject.authorisation required then
5: if DataObject.secure channel[(DataObject.target).owner] == TRUE then
6: return TRUE
7: end if
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Algorithm for integrity checking
1: procedure INTEGRITY CHECK(DataObject)
2: for all (DataObject.target).owner do
3: if DataObject.owner 6= (DataObject.target).owner and DataObject.integrity checked == TRUE then
4: return TRUE
5: end if
6: end for
7: end procedure
Algorithm 5 Algorithm for availability checking
1: procedure AVAILABILITY CHECK(DataObject)
2: for all DataObject.target do
3: if DataObject.owner 6= (DataObject.target).owner then
4: if ((DataObject.target).owner).authorisation level ≥ DataObject.authorisation required then
5: if DataObject.source 6= IS UNIQUE then
6: return TRUE
7: end if
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: end procedure
tion required attribute of data object) (line 4). Finally, the
existence of a secure communication channel between any
authorised target lane and the data object is checked via the
secure channel[Lane] attribute of the data object (line 5). If
the attribute has a value of TRUE for each target lane then
the confidentiality objective is satisfied.
4) Integrity: Integrity is concerned with ensuring that infor-
mation is protected from improper modifications so as to avoid
intentional or accidental unauthorised changes to system data
[9]. Similar to confidentiality, the entities relating to integrity,
in terms of business process models, are the data object, which
models the data handled during the process execution, and the
lane which models the entities exchanging said data.
As shown in Fig. 1, to capture aspects relating to integrity,
the integrity required and integrity checked attributes have
been introduced in the data object concept. When the in-
tegrity required attribute has a TRUE value, an integrity
constraint exists on the data object at hand, while if in-
tegrity checked attribute is set to TRUE the integrity of
the data object has been confirmed by appropriate security
mechanisms. The activities modelling the operationalisation
of such integrity implementing mechanisms are modelled as
security implementing activities with their security objective
attribute set to integrity. To signify that the integrity check-
ing has been performed, such activities include the method
check integrity(), which takes a data object as input and
changes the value of its integrity checked attribute to TRUE.
For the verification of the integrity objective of data objects
in a business process model, Algorithm 4 has been developed.
The algorithm takes as input a data object and identifies the
lane of each activity that consumes the data object (line 2).
If the data object’s source lane is different than its target lane
(line 3), which indicates that a data transfer has taken place,
the integrity checked value of the data object is checked (line
3). If the value is TRUE a successful integrity checking is
assumed to have been executed, thus signifying the satisfaction
of the integrity objective.
5) Availability: Availability describes the property of sys-
tem resources being accessible and usable upon demand by an
authorised entity [7]. Therefore, in terms of a business process
model, a system resource, modelled as a data object, needs
to be available to an authorised entity, modelled as a lane. To
capture aspects relating to availability, the extended metamodel
of Fig. 1 introduces the availability required attribute in the
concept of Data Object, which indicates that such an element
has an availability constraint placed upon it, if its value equals
TRUE.
The satisfaction of the availability constraint relates to the
structure of the workflow of a process model. Since a data
object need to be available upon demand, there is a need for
redundancy built into the workflow in order to ensure that
there is always more than one ways to reach the availability-
constraint process element. This means that an availability-
constraint data object, for instance, should be able to be
produced as the output of more than one activities. Therefore,
to check the satisfaction of an availability-constrain data object
we introduce Algorithm 5. This algorithm first checks if each
activity requiring the data object (line 2) belongs to a lane
different that the owner of the data object (line 3) and whether
that lane has the appropriate authorisation for accessing it (line
4). Finally, it checks whether the constraint data object sources
from more than one activities (line 5). If a value of TRUE
is returned, the availability objective for said data object is
assumed satisfied.
IV. APPLICATION OF ATTRIBUTE-BASED SECURITY
VERIFICATION
To demonstrate how the attribute-based security verification
can be applied, a business process from the public administra-
tion domain has been selected. The process involves citizens
residing in the municipality of Athens, Greece, who want to
get registered for using public swimming pool facilities. In
order to complete their registration, a number of documents
(i.e., medical certificate, birth certificate) issued by different
organisations (i.e., local clinic, municipality of Athens) need
to be collected and forwarded to the administration of the
swimming pool facility. Once the collected documents are
verified and the citizen is registered to the swimming pool
facility’s information system, a badge is provided so the citizen
can access the facilities.
A. Attribute instantiation
The process model describing the interaction between the
different roles, as illustrated in Fig. 3, was created with
the cooperation of DAEM S.A., the organisation in charge
of developing the information systems for the municipality
of Athens. The same stakeholders also assisted us in the
elicitation of the security requirements and the introduction of
the appropriate security implementing activities in the process
model, denoted with a padlock symbol at their top left corner.
Due to space limitations, in this section we will explore only a
subset of the elicited requirements in order to demonstrate and
evaluate the functionality of our approach. More specifically,
the security requirements that will be examined concern the
Confidentiality and Integrity of data objects D1: Medical
Certificate, D2: Birth Certificate and D3: Medical certificate
[Municipality of Athens Copy], while also the Authentication
required for the execution of activity A16: “Provide access to
pool facilities”.
The instantiated attributes of the security-constraint data
objects D1, D2 and D3 are included in Fig 3. First, the
attributes owner, source and target were automatically in-
stantiated according to the structure of the business process
model. Next, the attributes integrity required and confidential-
ity required were manually set to TRUE to reflect the elicited
security requirements. Finally, the attributes integrity checked
and secure channel[Lane] were automatically instantiated by
the methods check integrity() and set confidentiality(), as soon
as the confidentiality implementing activities A3 and A7
and the integrity implementing activities A5 and A9 were
introduced in the process model.
A similar series of actions was followed for the instantiation
of the attributes of the authentication-constraint activity A16.
Its owner lane (SP Information System) and its source (A15)
and target (A17) activities were automatically instantiated
according to the existing connections of the process model.
The authentication required attribute was set to TRUE dur-
ing the security requirement elicitation. Finally, activity A15
authenticates the citizen to the swimming pool facility using
the set authentication(Athenian Citizen) method to set the
authenticated attribute of the Athenian Citizen lane to TRUE.
B. Security verification results
In order to verify the satisfaction of the identified se-
curity requirements by the security implementing activities
introduced to the process by the system designers, the al-
gorithms introduced earlier in this work were provided to
them (i.e., Algorithms 3 and 4 for data objects D1, D2
and D3 and Algorithm 1 for activity A16). The authenti-
cation checking, performed using procedure AUTHENTI-
CATION CHECK A(A15) of Algorithm 1, indicated the
satisfaction of the authentication constraint for the activity A16
by the process model of Fig. 3. The same was true regarding
the integrity checking for data objects D1, D2 and D3.
Nevertheless, the confidentiality checking for each of the
three data objects identified a violation. More specifically,
since the confidentiality requirement has authorisation as a
prerequisite, the authorisation checking performed in line 4
of Algorithm 3 returned a FALSE value. This happens due
to the lack of any authorisation implementing activities in the
process model constructed by the system designers. Therefore,
even if a secure communication channel is established between
the clinic and the municipality for the transfer of the medi-
cal certificate document (D1) and between the municipality
and the swimming pool facility’s information system for the
transfer of documents D2 and D3, the same entities also
need the appropriate level of authorisation for handling such
documents, which they do not currently possess. Therefore,
authorisation implementing activities need to be introduced to
Fig. 3. Security-extended BPMN process model for citizen registration to swimming pool facility
the existing process model for the lanes of the municipality of
Athens and the swimming pool’s information system.
C. Discussion
The security verification of the above described real-life
process provided some insights regarding the applicability and
effectiveness of the proposed approach. The system designers
of the participating organisation had already identified the
security requirements that needed to be satisfied and were able
to instantiate the provided attributes and apply the proposed
verification algorithms without any significant issues. The
whole process did not require any prior knowledge of either
formal specification languages or technical security imple-
mentations. In fact, the prerequisites for using the proposed
approach is rather limited, as it requires users to have elicited
the security requirements of the process at hand and be familiar
with workflow elements of BPMN, which is an advantage in
terms of usability.
As discussed above, the application of the verification algo-
rithms identified some security-related issues at the existing
process model. The identification of such issues prompted
the system designers to update the business process model
in order to also implement authorisation where required. The
ability of the algorithms proposed by this work to identify
potential security violations and pinpoint their location within
the workflow of the process, constitutes a positive indication
of the overall effectiveness of the approach.
The application of the approach also revealed a number of
aspects that need to be further refined. More specifically, the
assignment of the security implementing activities, which are
required for our approach to properly function, requires some
intervention from experts. This is due to the fact that such
activities may need to introduced at specific places within the
workflow (e.g., directly before the execution of a constraint
activity). It can also be the case that certain pre-existing
process activities already perform security-implementing tasks
but still need to be identified and marked as such. For
instance, in the process illustrated in Fig. 3, activity A15
already existed as part of the process but needed to be
marked as an authentication-implementing activity by experts,
while confidentiality-implementing activities A3 and A7 where
placed after the elicitation of the respective security require-
ments. Therefore, in the future, a more structured approach
towards the integration of security-implementing activities
needs to be established, as it is rather ad-hoc at its current
stage.
The types of security requirements covered, as well as the
development of tool support, are some aspects the further
development of which would benefit the applicability and
effectiveness of our approach. More specifically, while in its
current form this approach is able to successfully verify a
number of traditional security requirements, more security-
related aspects have been identified by literature (e.g., [10]
lists accountability, auditability and non-repudiation) which
could be covered. Finally, the approach would benefit from
the development of automated modelling tool support, which
could facilitate the instantiation of the proposed attributes on-
the-fly, during the creation of the model and the execution of
the verification algorithms in the same environment. This issue
was not as prevalent in the application of our approach in this
specific case study but it could be an issue as the scale and
complexity of the models to be verified increases.
V. RELATED WORK
The variability introduced by the numerous available mod-
elling languages, combined with the subjectivity and arbitrari-
ness of manually created business process models, creates the
need for formal approaches to verify the produced process
designs [1]. Additionally, the verification of the compliance of
an organisation’s internal business processes to certain restric-
tions, internally (i.e., organisational standards and policies) and
externally (i.e., laws and regulations) imposed, is often a legal
requirement [2].
A common approach for checking the security properties
of business process models involves the specification of the
process model as a formal graph, the definition of the security
properties using formal propositional languages and the use
of an automated model checker, which takes as input the
graph and the formal property definitions to perform the
model checking. The work presented in [11] follows such
approach by checking delegation and revocation functional-
ities, expressed using linear temporal logic (LTL), of business
process models, captured as finite state machines (FSMs). In
[8] LTL is used to express authorisation constraints of process
models, translated in FSMs, in order to be verified by a model
checker. In [12] the security properties which the process must
fulfil are defined by φ formulas and the process model is
formally defined as a planning system. Similarly, in [13] Petri-
Nets are used to capture process models and automated tool
support is provided for the identification of transitions between
process elements that may lead to information leaks. The work
presented in [14] validates security-related aspects of business
processes by formalising both the created process model and
its “security desiderata” before using them as input to a model
checker. The model checker automatically analyses the formal
model to check for violations of the security constraints and
translates the results of this analysis to easily comprehensible
graphical notation. A similar attempt is presented in [15]
where Security Validation as a Service (SVaaS) is introduced
as a cloud-based approach to business process security compli-
ance checking where all relevant security related information
along with the process model are captured in the form of a
Business Process Compliance Problem (BPCP). The BPCP is
translated into a formal specification language and used as
input for a model checker, which returns the analysis results in
a graphical manner. Finally, [16] presents an approach for the
static checking of conformance of service implementations to
security requirements specified at the process level via source
code analysis and covers access control, separation of duty
and need-to-know properties.
Most of the approaches introduced by the scientific literature
of the area introduce overwhelming complexity for non-expert
users which severely hinders their widespread adoption by
the industry today [2], [4]. One important drawback of such
approaches is their limited support for modelling techniques,
as most of them require process models to be transformed
in a specific manner (e.g., Petri-nets, FSMs) before they
can be used as input for a model checker. This contrasts
with the variety of modelling languages used in practice
and introduces a considerable overhead in terms of time and
expert knowledge [17], as large numbers of processes need
to be remodelled using a specific modelling technique. In
contrast, the approach presented in this work uses BPMN
2.0, the “de-facto” standard for business process modelling
[6], without the need to further translate neither the process
model, nor the security requirements in formal specifications.
Additionally, the range of compliance rules supported by
works in the area of security verification is limited [2], as
most approaches support a subset of security properties related
to role assignment and user permissions (e.g., separation
of duty, access control). Our work shifts the focus towards
traditional security requirements (authentication, authorisation,
confidentiality, integrity, availability), which can be verified by
the structure of the workflow of the process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The verification of security properties of business processes
is an important aspect of their development lifecycle, as it
can validate that a process model is indeed secure before its
execution begins. Nevertheless, the applicability of existing
approaches for security verification suffers due to their com-
plexity, lack of practicality and dependency on specialised
knowledge. This work proposes an attribute-based approach
for process security verification, as an attempt to overcome
the above limitations. The proposed approach extends existing
BPMN process elements with attributes that capture informa-
tion about certain properties of the workflow. Based on such
attributes, a number of conditions are defined, which need
to be met by the structure of the models workflow for the
satisfaction of each security requirement. Finally, algorithms
that check such conditions are also developed, the execution
of which performs the security verification of a process model.
The application of the proposed approach in a real life
system provided some initial positive insights regarding its
applicability and effectiveness, while also identified some
aspects in need of further refinement. More specifically, the
positive aspects included the ease-of-use of the approach, since
it did not require any prior knowledge of formal languages by
the process designers and analysts and its effectiveness, since it
was able to identify and pinpoint parts of the designed process
that violated specific security requirements.
Future directions of this work will focus on the extending
the proposed approach to provide coverage to a wider range of
security requirements. Its application will be further supported
with the addition of rules to explicitly define the integra-
tion of security implementing activities during the design of
business process models. Automated tool support will also
be an important step towards increasing the ease-of-use of
the proposed approach, as it will limit the need for manual
intervention during the instantiation and verification process.
Finally, a more extensive evaluation of the approach in real-life
settings will allow us to extract further conclusions regarding
its performance and applicability.
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